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EXTERNALITIES AS COMMODITIES: COMMENT 
by Toby Page and John Ferejohn* 
In the A. E. R., in 1957 Trenery Dolbear [l] constructed a simple gen-
eral equilibriwn model which demonstrated, among other things, that Pigovian 
unit effluent taxes could not be expected to be both Pareto optimal and ex­
actly compensatory to pollution sufferers.!
/ 
Calling this result Dolbear's 
"negative conclusion," Robert Meyer [3J set out to generalize Dolbear's mo-
del and derive conditions under which Pigovian taxes would "simultaneously 
achieve a Pareto optimum and yield exact compensation." 
In his communication Meyer wrote, "The negative conclusion of Dolbear 
is presumably predicated on some type of non-convexity which is not stated 
explicitly. It is shown here that the absence of non-convexities is the 
prime assumption which yields a conclusion contrary to Dolbear's" [3, p. 737]. 
Meyer's idea is that with the appropriate convexity assumptions Pigovian 
taxes will, in general, allow both welfare-efficiency and exact compensation. 
The purpose of this note is first to point out that Meyer is mistaken in 
thinking that the source of Dolbear's "negative conclusion" is in lack of 
convexity conditions and then to point out the actual role of convexity for 
environmental transfer functions. 
Dolbear's model is well behaved with respect to convexity. Instead of 
non-convexities causing the general impossibility of Pareto- optimal 
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Pigovian taxes being e:x:actly compensatory, .the dif:ficulty is an e:x:aJ!IDle of' a 
regularity in economics: it generally takes at least two policy instruments 
(per-unit truces and lump-sum transfers) to achieve two policy goals (P areto 
optimality and exa<:t compensation).
I. Necessity of Two Instrume.nts 
In Dolbear's model there are two consumers, x and Y: 11x lives by 
bread and hea.t, Y lives by bread a1.one11, although Y also involuntarily con­
sumes smoke f'ram X's heat; Y's smoke consumption is proportional to X's use 
of' heat; the production possibility frontier between heat and bread is lin-
ear. We limit ourselves to the case where we start with an endowment of OB 
bread for X and BF bread for Y. Mr. X can trade bread f'or heat, incidental­
ly increasing Y's consumption of' smoke (in units heat). Y's role is com­
pletely :passive: he consumes just the bread he was endowed with and the 
smoke blown his wa:y. 
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Ins.ide the production possibility set, which is also an Edgeworth tri­
angle, indifference curves are drawn for X and Y.'?../ Points of tangency of 
in-J.ifference curves form the conventional "contract11 curve CC'. With ini-
tial endowment B, X will trade himself down to E1, carrying Y to OJ1 units 
of smoke consumption willy-nilly and leaving Y's bread consumption unchanged. 
A Pigovian effluent tax, whose revenue goes to Y in units of compensatory 
bread, steepens X1s effective budget constraint. Relative to initial endow-
rnent B, different Pigovian tax rates trace out a Y's "price consumption" 
cu..'>'Ve PP1• 
Y's indifference curve through B specifies the exact compensation re-
quirements. Clearly, it will not in general happen that BB', PP', and CC' 
intersect at the same point, in which case a Pigovian tax can be both Par-
eta optimal and exactly compensatory. By the geometry, the exceptional case 
can only happen at corner solutions or if Y's relevant indifference curve 
is a straight line segment. 
What then led Meyer to thin.It that one could generally find Pigovian 
t2xes both Pareto optimal and exactly compensatory? It seems that Meyer has 
mistaken the set of Pareto solutions given by maximizing a Lagrangian with 
solutions of a general equilibrium model. In searching for the Pareto set 
we are not interested in the original income allocation or its later reallo-
cation through tax transfers. In maximizing the Lagrangian, we can imagine 
a benevolent dictator making implicit lump-sum transfers which insure some 
utilities are held constant as we move from one allocation to another. 
Meyer's l'.llOdel gives us conditions defining the Pareto set, but it is 
incomplete as a general equilibriwn model because it neglects the income 
transfer aspects (and limitations) of the Pigovian taxes. Having neglected 
income redistribution attendant in equilibrium models, Meyer attributes 
more flexibility to Pigovian taxes tbiln they actually have, 
Dolbear's model, on the other hand, qualifies as a simple general 
equilibrium model. Distribution is determined by initial endowment and 
Pigovian taxes, which, as we have seen above, can distribute only ac-
cording to a fixed rule. If out of all Pigovian taxes we choose the one 
with welfare efficiency, we will be stuck with the implied distribution. 
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If a policy maker lilanted Pareto-optimal Pigovian taxes to compensate ex­
actly, he would need another degree of freedom, that is, another policy 
instrument. Dolbear recomrnended lwnp-sum transfers. The appropriate lump­
sum transfer will move pp• just enough so that it will go through the inter­
section of CC' and BB'. 
Where then is Meyer's formal mistake? In his more general model, 
for which Dolbear's is a special (but more complete) case, Meyer maxi­
mizes one man1 s utility subject to at least covering prescribed utility 
levels for the others and subject to production and externality inter­
action constraints. To test whether or not per unit Pi.govian t:axe:r can 
achieve exact compensation and efficiency, Meyer wri tes1 11 • • •  one need 
only replace constraints (5) [J- � lJ1] by equality constraints of the form 
tr'" ti' . . . " [3, p. 739]. 
However, this is not a valid test. Narrowing the utility constraint 
has no effect on the maximum as long as the utility possibility frontier 
is negatively sloped (normal in positive orthant). With neoclassical 
utility functions and a negatively sloped utility frontier, there is no 
need to "waste" extra utility on u1 beyond the bare minimum if. We can 
be sure there will be no sla�k if, that is rf > lf-, at the maximum. 
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In Dolbear's model the utility frontier is downward sloping. One 
can check this by looking at the contract curve. On the utility possi­
bility frontier, X's utility goes down while Y's goes up. Changing the 
constraint ri' 2 ijY to df � lf' has no effect on the maximization of tf. 
Dolbear' s model passes Meyer's t"est, but there is almost always no exact 
compensation, as we have seen. 
There is an interesting complication, though. In the presence of 
externalities it is conceivable that the utility frontier might look like: 
,j 
q 
ijl u1 
In this case narrowing the constraint set from u1;:::.: U1 
l -1 to u- = U does 
change max J2. A model with this utility frontier would pass Meyer's 
test (the conditions satisfying max rJ subject to u1 = U1 would lead. to 
q utility for individual 2) but Dolbear's 11negative conclusion" would 
still hold. Not only do we have no income transfer mechanis m to lead us 
to (U1,q) but also (U1, q) is not Pareto-optimal either. It seems, how­
ever, that externality bads are more likely to bow the utility frontier 
in than out.JI' 
II. Why Exact Compensation in Addition to Sfficienc�? 
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Having said this, we raise the question why a policy maker would ·want 
Pareto-optimal Pigovian taxes to have exact compensation. Especially for 
pollution flowing from producers to consumers, pollutant emissions are 
analogous to (other) factors of production. Pareto-optimal Pigovian taxes, 
in other externality models besides Dolbear•s, are likely to provide sur-
pluses to pollution sufferers, as well as to polluters, over the situation 
in which pollution is prohibited. Just as it seems odd to devise lump-sum 
transfers to skim off a laborer's -wage surplus, it seems odd that a policy 
maker should be interested in skimming off a pollution sufferer's surplus 
by insisting on exact compensation. 
III. Convexity 
In most nee-classical models, concave functions are needed to insure 
stability and interior solutions. Although Meyer has not placed any condi­
tions on his transfer functions gi, the behavior of the gi turns out to be 
important and perhaps slightly counter-intuitive. Interestingly, in Meyer's 
model, convex transfer functions gi assure interior solutions with Pigovian 
taxes. 
With 
u"(B,s) X's concave utility function between 
bread and smoke and 
s g(H) the tr3.nsfer function, linking smoke 
to Y's heat consumption, 
u"(B,g(H)) may n0t be concave in B and H for con-
cave function g. 
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A simple counter-example illustrates the point. Choose tf(B,S) B-S
as our concave function of B and S. 1/2 For g(H) � H = S, 
(1) 1/2 . U(B�g(H)) = B-H 1 s not concave in B and. H�
and the indifference curves bend the "wrong" •ray. We note that if g had 
been convex, X's indifference curves between bread and heat would have been 
convex. The desirable convexity property of the environmental transfer 
function g can be stated more strongly as follows: 
If U(B,S) is concave, u2 < 0 {pollution is a bad), g{H) = S an in­
creasing,� fUnction, then V(B,H) = U(B,g(H)) is concave. 
A little algebra on the minors of ( v11 v12) establishes 
\:21 v22 
the propo-
si tion. 
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In Figure 2(a) the fur.1ction smoke = g1(heat) is concave and the f'unc­
t::on smoke = g2(heat) is convex. Figure 2(b) shows one of Y's indifference
curves bet-ween smoke and bread. It is bent do-wnwa1·d in a well-behaved way� 
With the 45° line, Figure 2(d), this indifference curve is transformed into
an .indifference curve between heat and bread, depending on the functional 
f'orn. of g. SUf'ficiently concave g2 1.eads to indifference curves bending up 
in Figure 2(c). 1he shear transformation between Figures 2 and 3 leaves the
indi:ff'erence curve convexities the same. Superimposed on Figure 4, Dolbear's
Bigeworth triangle, y1 has the same ty:pe of convexity as indifference curves
of' V.!". X, a situation leading to corner solutions. 
What one thinks about the convexity of actual transfer functions de-
pends partly on where one cuts ofr the transfer. For example, if S = g(H) 
describes street-level densities of smoke as a £'unction of heat emissions, 
we may consider g nearly linear. But if S "' g(H) describes health damage as
a f'unction of heat emissiOn, the :f'unction may be convex, due to diminishing
returns to biological defenses. 
Important policy implications follow from the degree of convexity of 
the environmental transfer functions. The more concave are the g, the more 
li�€ly we are to recommend all or nothing policy prescriptions. Suppose, 
fo� example, water pollution damage functions are concave. Then we may want 
s�:le rivers to be tr�ut...,clean and some industrial sewers. If the damage func-
ti�n is convex, it is more likely that a little pollution in all rivers is 
a better policy. For more convex damage functions interior, mixed solu-
ti.ans are more likely than corner solutions§ Similar considerations apply 
to the question of whether smoking should be permitted throughout a bus or 
�:i.e:.her it should be segregated to one end. And again the convexity of air 
pollution damage functions partly determines whether it is wiser to limit 
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pea.k episodes, by e!llergency measures, or to emphasize control of the chronic 
average pollutant levels. 
At this time t�re are f'ew empirical studies which shed light on the 
question o:f convexity f'or g. Using SMSA's� Lester Lave [2] regressed total 
mortality rate on ti.r pollution variables (minimum and maxi.mum ·Ci-fo-week
averages of sulfates and particulates) and sociologicnl variables� With 
both piecewise linear and quadratic specifications of' the pollution var­
iables, there was some evidence that g, here a damage i'unction, is concave 
:for long-run air pollution effects� 'lhe evidence is weak because the coef­
ficients are nearly a1J.. insignificant and the sociological variable, percent
over 65, seems to be carrying the equations�
For cases where the damage f'unction is sufficiently concave, the
policy prescription w:ill be non-Pigovian. Depending on which
corner solution is better, pollution should be either outlawed altogether or 
allowed without e:ay constraint.
However, we think that in many cases g will be convex, due to diminish­
ing returns to environmental. capacity. For example, congestion is more than 
proportional to the number of cars on a highway. 
An air pollution study provides a fragment of evidence- of this second
alternative. Page estimated the impact of daily levels of sulfuI• dioxide 
and particulates, in London, along with meteorological and psychological var­
iables on a measure o� perceived health (4). The nonlinear equation 
(2) Ht= �o + �1 L:l.
i 3�-1 + �2vt + •t
was estimated, where 
� is the number of people who feel worse on day t, 
St is Sulfur dioxide on day t, 
Vt is visibility on day t,
o. is non-linearity 11stretching11 coefficient, and
A is Koyck lag coefficient. 
•• is the error term 
ll 
The stretching coef'f'icient a was 1. 5, indicating that this measure of per-
ceived health is a convex .function of the daily sulfur dioxide J.oad. In an-
other approach the same linear equation of heal.th as a function of pollution 
and meteorological variables was estimated for yee.rs of' high, medium, and 
low pollution. Decline in the pollution coefficients from the high to low 
years also suggested a convex damage f'unction for pollution variables. 
Most likely, transfer f'unctions exist iu a variety of forms, i'rom con­
cave to convex. While little has been done empirically to estimate transfer 
functions, :from polluting sender tO Suffering receiver, this is a.ii ·area ripe 
for econometric work. It is also an area ripe for theorists, for the rela-
tion of transfer functions to changes in location of receivers and senders 
lies at the heart of the externality problem, especia.lly for the most inter-
esting case of large numbers of polluters and receivers. 
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FOOTNOTES 
l. Ex:act compensation for a pollutant leaves a potential pollution sufferer 
ind.i.i'f'erent between the pollutant's prohibition and its all.owance with
compensation. 
.2. The origin for X's indifference curves is o; the origin for Y1s indif.fer-
ence curves is F. The a.1.location point E)_ specifies 1S_R1 bread to Y and
.I\Ji bread to X; o.r1 smoke to Y and o.r1 heat to x. In the diagram, Y is
indifferent between CIS.E:J. bread, OJ1 smoke) and (�.E2 bread., o2� smoke). 
3. For rnOre on this point see Ba.umol [5J.
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